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THE MALONEY ACT EXPERIMENT
TAMAR HED-HOFMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1938 Congress passed an Act' to amend the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by adding, inter alia, a new section. The object of this
amendment, the Maloney Act, was to encourage over-the-counter
dealers to organize and regulate their activities under governmental
supervision.'
The scheme, "a unique experiment in supervised self-regulation,"'
was hailed as an "especially provocative exercise of governmental
power by a private organization."' It was to be the instrument which
supplies exactly what voluntary self-regulatory attempts have
heretofore lacked, power within the business itself to enforce
rules and regulations requiring conduct higher in standard
than even that which the government could effectively re-
quire by law.6
Under the Maloney Act, more than one association of broker
dealers could apply for recogniton, yet only one did—the National.
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
NASD). Today the NASD embraces almost all the broker dealers
in the United States.'
This experiment by the NASD was expected to yield useful
material for other industries, especially "if the pressure for expand-
ing social controls over private business continued to mount.'
This expectation did not materialize. No other legislation followed in
* Born and educated in Israel; graduate, the Jerusalem Law Classes; additional
study, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem; LL.M. Harvard Law School 1964; candi-
date for S.J.D. Harvard Law School. Israeli Ministry of Justice 1949-50; private practice
of law in Tel Aviv.
1 Over-the-Counter Market Act, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1958).
.2 Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1, 45 (1957).
3 Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Report of Special Study •of Securities Markets,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 188 (1963).
4 1 Davis, Administrative Law 141 (1958).
5 Over-the-counter Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 Yale L.J. 633, 646 (1938).
Finally, no writer in this area should fail to cite Douglas, Democracy and Finance 82
(Allen ed. 1940). "Government," said he, will play "the residual role . . . [it] would
keep the shot gun so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, clear, ready for use,
but with the hope that it would never be used."
8 In 1962, of 5,785 registered broker dealers, about 4,750 were NASD members.
H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 16. For the organizational scheme of the NASD
see generally Grant, The National Association of Securities Dealers, 1942 Wis. L. Rev.
597 (1942); 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1365-69 (2d ed. 1961).
7 Westwood & Howard, Self Government in the Securities Business, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 518 (1952).
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the footsteps of the Maloney Act; no other business followed the lead
of the NASD.
In 1959 the NASD celebrated its twentieth anniversary. This
prompted evaluations of its past performance by the association and
others. The articles written on the subject dealt with one or more
aspects of the NASD and concluded that on the whole the experiment
had been a success.'
This paper will attempt to evaluate the Maloney Act experiment,
not by a meticulous investigation into some aspects of the problems
of the securities industry, but by an analysis of the system as a whole.
In order to facilitate such a discussion, an inquiry will be made into
the functions of the broker dealer and into the history and organiza-
tion of the NASD.
II. THE BROKER DEALER: A PROFILE OF A TRADE
Although the very name "broker dealer" points to a double capac-
ity, the functions included in that profession are much more diverse.
A many-faced man indeed, a broker dealer is a banker, a dealer, a
broker, an advisor, a market maker, a fiduciary,' and a professional.
The last two categories differ from the preceding ones because they
describe a .status more than an activity. They also point to a trend
which, it is believed, may lead to a new classification and set clearer
standards for the duties of the broker dealer. Each of the said cate-
gories, however, merits a closer examination.
A: The Banker
Whether or not the activities' of the broker dealer fall within
the legal definition of :banking,_the two functionsare similar. The
broker dealer keeps his customers' funds and securities; he grants
his customers loans; he uses money deposited with him for his own
business as - his working capital.'
Broker-dealers have contended that the principle of a debtor-
creditor relationship should be applicable to the broker and his cus-
tomer, pointing out that "brokers have always considered that the
8 See Loss, supra note 6, at 1391; Rutter, The National. Association of Securities
Dealers: Continuing Government-Industry Cooperative Regulation in the Over-the-
Counter Securities Industry, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 611 (1962).
9 Loss, supra note 6, at 1184-92. The latter feature means that the funds so deposited
are debts due from the broker dealer to the customer and are not trust funds. Gen-
erally, in an ordinary deposit, the relation between the bank and the depositor is that
of debtor and creditor. See 1 Scott, Trusts 125, § 12.9 (2d ed. 1956). This distinction
becomes important if the recipient of the funds becomes insolvent. Scott points out that:
If .. the trustee-becomes insolvent, the beneficiary is entitled to the money if
he can identify it . . . or . . . trace it into a product. . . 	 a debt was
created the creditor is entitled to no priority... .
1 Scott, Trusts 119, § 12.6 (2d ed. 1956).
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relationship between the broker and a customer with a free credit
balance is that of a debtor and creditor.'" Contrary to this view,
"there is authority that a broker holds funds in a fiduciary capacity
when he receives them for the purchase of a security outright or when
they are proceeds from the sale of a security."n
A trustee is under two obligations: first, to use the trust money
for the benefit of the fiduciary; second, to segregate it from other
monies. The rationale of the first requirement is protection of the
trust from misuse by the trustee; the reason for the second is its
insulation from the claims of the trustee's creditors should he become
insolvent. If the money is considered a debt, both of these safeguards
are gone.
Far from being academic, this problem involves enormous sums
of money. Full information is not available, but according to the
New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter referred to as NYSE) report
of January 1, 1962, the amount of free credit balances held by mem-
bers varied from 1,207 to 1,508 million dollars during the year 1961.
The firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith held approximately
233 million dollars in free credit balances on May 26, 1961. Other
figures are no less staggering. 12
The development of the legal relationship between banker and
customer indicates the justification for both the broker dealer's de-
mand to consider the deposit money a debt, as well as the arguments
against this positiori. The law governing banking has adapted itself
•to the new requirements of economic life without relinquishing its role
of providing protection to the public." On the one hand, it is now
settled that the banker is the debtor and not the trustee of his
customer. On the other hand, the law now ensures every depositor
repayment of his money on demand. In addition, the banker is no
longer free to exercise his discretion in making investments. He must
invest a certain sum in liquid assets, refrain from speculative trans-
actions, and obey other regulations of this nature. The method of
policing his compliance with the law has also changed. It is no longer
left to the beneficiary. The banker is required to keep books and
records, and the government's examiners exercise surveillance—as a
prophylactic measure—to ensure that business is conducted accord-
ing to its regulations. This is the price the banker pays for the use
of his depositor's money.
10 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Securities and Exchange Commission
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
I, at 829 (1952) (remarks of Mr. John J: Mann, Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the New York Curb, now the American Stock Exchange).
11 Loss, supra note 6, at n.9, 1185-86.
12 See H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 394.
13 5 Zollmann, Banks and Banking 132 (1936). '
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Although the broker dealer insists on a debtor-creditor relation-
ship with his customer with regard to deposits, the laws governing his
activities and the control over them are very different from those
regulating the banker's functions." The principal rules governing the
broker dealer in his quasi-banking activities are similar to the rules
which applied to bankers before legislative intervention. A customer
whose funds have been misused by the broker dealer finds his remedies
in the law prohibiting misuse of trust money. The NASD rules repeat
this same principle of law: a broker dealer is responsible for misuse
of customers' funds." Yet the NASD insists that these funds are a
debt due to the customer. This position is legally untenable. The
relationship of debtor-creditor and trustee-beneficiary cannot exist as
to a particular transaction at the same time." "The funds deposited
become a part of the property of the bank, which it may, without be-
coming criminally liable, mingle with its other assets and use in its
business until a notice of withdrawal is served . . . ."' 7
Although this writer is aware of no case where the defense of a
debtor-creditor relationship was raised in answer to a charge of misuse
of customers' funds, it is difficult to see how this double standard can
be reconciled. In addition to the general rules on misuse of trust
money, the Exchange Act of 1934 limits the hypothecation of cus-
tomers' securities to the aggregate amount of indebtedness of all
the customers of the broker dealer." The NASD further limits the
amount for which the customers' securities may be hypothecated to
what is "fair and reasonable in view of the indebtedness of the said
customer to said member.""
There are two ways to safeguard customers' monies against the
claims of broker dealers' creditors. The first is to prohibit the com-
mingling of customers' funds; the second is to ensure the financial
stability of the broker dealer, i.e., the preventive rule. The prohibition
against mingling applies to securities only. Even when the necessary
customer's consent is obtained, mingling is allowed only with the secur-
ities of other customers." As for free credit balances, there are no
rules which require segregation, although the NASD encourages this
practice in case of deposits against "when issued" and "when distrib-
14 For a comparison of the applicable regulatory statutes, see generally Subcommit-
tee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Compara-
tive Regulations of Financial Institutions, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
18 NASD Rules of Fair Practice (hereinafter R.F.P.), Art. III § 19(a). See also
SEAR No. 6986, F. R. Gentry & Co. (1963); SEAR No. 6767, Peter Widdershoven
(1963).
16
 Johnson v. Ward, 2 Ill. App. (2d Bradwell) 261, 275-76 (1878).
27
 Zollmann, supra note 13, at 145-46.
18
 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1958).
R.F.P., Art. III § 19(c).
20 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1958).
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uted" transactions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (herein-
after the SEC), though empowered to do so,' has not promulgated a
rule to require segregation. Segregation of securities may present very
great practical difficulties in view of the size and magnitude of the
deposits. Segregation of free credit balances is incompatible with the
debtor-creditor relationship which, as the industry asserts, exists with
regard to these funds.
The main preventive rule to.protect customers' funds is the Net
Capital Rule enacted by the SEC under Section 15(c)(3) of the
Exchange Act of 1934. 22
 This rule provides that the broker dealer's
aggregate indebtedness to all people shall not exceed 2000% of his
net capital, as computed by the rule.' The Net Capital Rule contains
objective standards; its operation does not depend upon judgment and
evaluation but upon mathematical calculation. It can be enforced by
examination of books and records, which examination also has a pre-
ventive effect. The result is a high level of solvency.'
The NASD does not have a rule pertaining to capital require-
ments. It merely polices the Net Capital Rule of the Commission. The
NYSE, on the other hand, does impose upon its members more
stringent capital requirements and polices them more effectively."
Two additional rules, one enacted jointly (though enforced . dif-
ferently) by the NASD and the NYSE,' and the other developed by
the SEC,27
 deal with the prohibition to engage in business while in-
solvent. The NASD rule provides that a customer, viz., a person whose
cash and securities are already in the hands of the broker dealer, may
require his broker dealer to disclose his financial position. This rule
enables the suspicious customer either to allay his fears or to sub-
stantiate them. The SEC rule prohibits the broker dealer from engaging
in'husiness while insolvent. The NYSE, on the other hand, imposes a
duty on a member to notify the exchange of his insolvency. The same
duty is imposed on any other member who has heard that another
21 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1958).
22 This section empowers the SEC to promulgate rules for the financial responsi-
bility of broker dealers.
23 Loss, supra note 6, at 1350-55; SEAR No. 7142, Babson, Kaye & Robb Co.
(1963) ; SEAR No. 7055, Valley Forge Sec. Co. (1963) ; H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note
3, pt. 1, at 407-10.
24 The SEC had held that it was no answer to a violation of the rule that the
customer did not suffer any loss. He was exposed to the risk of insolvency of the broker
dealer. That was sufficient to establish a violation. SEAR No. 7010, Metropolitan Sec.
Inc. (1963).
•	 25 H.R. Doc. 95, supra note 3, pt. 5, at 179. See NYSE Rule 317, CCH N.Y. St.
Ex. Guide V 2319, which deals with bonding requirements.
26 R.F.P., Art. III § 22. While the NASD leaves it to the customer to police the
members' insolvency, the NYSE undertakes to do this itself.
27 3 Loss, Securities Regulation, 1435-38, 1444 (2d ed. 1961). In the context of this
rule, insolvency includes the failure to meet obligations.
191
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
member is insolvent. Upon such notice, membership is immediately
suspended."
All this "incidental banking," as Professor Loss calls it," has
never been supervised, as such, either by state or federal authorities.
Demands for more stringent rules have not found a sympathetic ear,
mainly because the industry's record was good. 3° It seems that the
NYSE is moving toward joint responsibility of its members and will
probably cover loss by insurance. The NASD will not be able to do
that. Insurance would be much too expensive, if available at all. The
development here is toward the elimination of the small firms as
independent operators. This is inevitable and desirable, if the public
is to be protected. No one can seriously doubt the necessity of mini-
mum capital requirements for operating a bank. There is no reason
to consider the same requirement unnecessary in the case of a broker
dealer. It seems that these requirements should be even more stringent
for a broker dealer than for a bank, if we consider that the securities
industry is a billion dollar one and that the broker dealer's other
complex and conflicting activities might affect his financial position.
Of all the broker dealer's functions, the banking aspect is easiest
to regulate. The rules are based on an objective test. The mens rea is
relevant only to a small degree." Evidence is mostly by written docu-
ments. The requirements do not interfere with the everyday execution
of the business. These rules have been widely accepted and have proved
workable. Lastly, the rules are not in themselves conflicting, either
as to the standard they set, or to the activities they prescribe. It should
be noted that these conflicts do exist in other rules governing the broker
dealer.
• We shall return to this subject in the latter half of this paper.'
Nevertheless, the following questions arise: Why are the Exchanges
more successful in enforcing the rules than the NASD? Does the
present situation, with or without the stricter controls proposed by
the Special Study of the SEC," afford- sufficient protection to the
public? And is self-regulation the best way to regulate the securities
industry? If so, should we have a different system of control for the
Exchanges than for the NASD?
28 CCH N.Y. St. Ex. Guide Art, XIII, 1601-02.
29 Loss, supra . note 6, at 1186, 1190.
• 30 For a recommendation of more stringent rules, segregation of excess margin and
•fully paid securities, articulation by the SEC of the NASD rule as to "reasonable rela-
tionship" between the debt of the customer and the amount which his securities may be
hypothecated, and an amendment of Section 60(e) of the Bankruptcy Act to facilitate
the recovery by the customers of money and fully paid securities; see H.R. Doc. No. 95,
supra note 3, at pt. 1, 415-16.
al SEAR No. 6931, Richard H. Holman (1962).
32 See infra §¢ III and IV.
33 See supra note 30.
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B. The Broker
The broker is his customer's agent; hence, his interests must not
conflict with those of his customer.- Moreover, it must be his interest
to achieve the goals set by the customer. In order successfully to carry
out his agency, the agent stands in the shoes of his principal. In short,
he becomes his principal's fiduciary; as such, he has a duty not to
profit at the expense of the beneficiary."
Whenever an agency exists, it is the principal who usually needs
protection. The law has provided for this by imposing duties upon the
agent regarding both the performance of his obligations and the dis-
closure of relevant facts, thereby enabling the principal to effectively.
police the agent's performance. It seems right that the policing should
be done by the principal. Apart from the great difficulty of policing
by outsiders, , the choice of the agent originally lies with the principal.
The choice is his and the risk is his; hence, the policing should also
be his.
Prima fade, there is no reason why the rules mentioned above
should not apply to a broker dealer who acts as a broker, or why addi-
tional rules should be necessary. Yet, such additional rules are needed.
When a persbn may act either by himself or through an agent, he
should bear the risk of malfeasance by his agent. In the case of a
broker dealer the public . has little choice. The individual investor
must, in most cases, resort to the services of the broker dealer. More-
over, the broker is the expert; the customer does not possess the rele-
vant information needed to criticize, judge, or police •the broker's
performance. The broker dealer usually acts in more than one capacity.
Conflicts of interest may arise. Additional protection for the customer
may be needed.
One of the most disturbing features of the broker dealers activi-
ties as an agent is his laxity of performance. As an agent, he is under.
a duty to secure for his customer the "best price discoverable in the
exercise of reasonable diligence."' The Special Study of the SEC has
found that compliance with this standard is not always achieved, for
the following reasons: the broker's lack of information and his lack
of diligence in performance; the order clerk's habitual turning to the
same dealer without trying to shop for betters terms; the wholesaler's
violation of the NASD rules by giving gratuities to the order clerk;
34 "A fiduciary relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for
the benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the rela-
tion." 1 Scott, Trusts 38 2.5 (2c1. ed. 1956). The SEC follows the common law rule:
namely, that a broker dealer acting as an agent for a customer in the execution of a
transaction assumes the obligations of a fiduciary.
36
 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 623.
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the firm members' personal "understandings" among themselves; and
the NASD's faulty policing of the broker."
It would seem that the main reason for the broker dealer's laxity
of performance is the lack of knowledge on the part of the customer.
He is the only one who has the interest and opportunity to check on the
broker, but his inadequate information leads to inefficiency in the
agent's performance. The Special Study of the SEC found the NASD
policing of the broker's activities to be faulty.
Cloudiness also surrounds the broker's remuneration. The lan-
guage of the NASD rules is vague. Charges must be "reasonable and
not unfairly discriminatory between customers!'" There must also
be an exploration of what is "fair" by '
taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances in-
cluding market conditions with respect to such security at the
time of the transaction, the expense of executing the order
and the value of any service he may have rendered by reason
of his experience in and knowledge of such security and the
market therefor."
The following questions still remain unanswered: What is unfair
discrimination between customers? What are reasonable charges? Does
the inefficient firm- receive remuneration according to its own per-
formance, or will it be judged by the performance of another firm,
either the most efficient or the mediocre one? How much should a
broker earn? And how should the value of other services which he
performs be computed so that his charge can be determined?
C. The Dealer
The dealer sells and buys securities for his own account. If the
broker dealer were acting only in this capacity, and if securities were
simple merchandise, there would, be fewer problems. But, as noted
above, the dealer usually acts in more than one capacity. Further,
securities are not even "intricate merchandise"; they are not mer-
chandise at all in the usual sense of the word.
Buyers and sellers of property are, generally conceived
of as acting "at arm's length"; if after negotiations they
agree upon the terms of a purchase and sale, the transaction
is binding upon each, even though one of them may thereby
benefit at the expense of the other from his superior knowl-
edge or astuteness."
88 See generally H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 3.
87 R.F.P., Art. III {I 3.
88 R.F.P., Art. III 4.
88 Frey, supra note 2, at 2.
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There is, however, an important exception to this generalization: i.e.,
that of fraudulent conduct. In cases of misrepresentation, manipUla-
don, nondisclosure, and malpractice by broker dealers, governmental
intervention is required.
Under the old established classification in which a dealer is a
seller of merchandise, he is under an obligation not to defraud or to
mislead customer. The securities statutes enlarged the area of
protection fOr the customer." Yet the concept of fraud and misrep-
resentation is still the basis of the duties of a dealer qua dealer.4'
Liability for complete non-disclosure, as distinguished from half-truth
(which liability did not exist at common law), is only partially estab-
lished under the securities statutes. The securities acts impose dis-
closure requirements on the dealer in specific situations. 42 The require
ment of disclosure 'operates as a deterrent and gives the customer a
measure of equality in the bargaining process.° The' problem becomes
acute when the dealer acts in more than one capacity. The develop-
Ment of the laws relating to the dealer's duties is greatly influenced
by the broker-dealer-advisor combination. It is therefore useful to
relate the tale of the proposal for the segregation of functions of
brokers and dealers.
"An aspect of exchange trading which gave Congress considerable
concern ... was the frequent combination in one man of the functions
of a broker acting for clients and of a dealer acting for his own
profit.' 94 The SEC was given the power, under Section 11(b) of the
Exchange Act of 1934, to deal with this problem. The SEC conducted
a study and published a report in 1936, in which it recommended
further study and no immediate action.° The report dealt with seg-
regation of the dealer function from the broker function. It did not
consider additional segregation in the sense• that a dealer could deal
with the public through a broker, thereby segregating the dealer from
the public.46 The report concedes that some of the abuses in the securi-
ties industry are the direct result of the combination of broker and
dealer functions: namely, the inducement of brokerage customers to
.	 40 See Loss, supra note 27, at 1435-38, 1444 for a comparison between the
protection afforded by the common law and by the current statutes.
41 Cary, The Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 565 (1964).
42 The NASD rules cover almost the same territory. See R.F.P., Art. III In 7, 12,
13, 14, and 22.
43 For an assessment of the current rule of disclosure, see Knauss, A Reappraisal of
the Role of Disclosure, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 635 (1964).
44 See Loss, supra note 6, at 1201.
45 SEC Report.on the Feasibility and Advisability of the Complete Segregation of
the Functions of Dealer and Broker, p. II, at 22-23 (1936).
. ' 48 This wouId:be according to the English model on the London Stock Exchange;
Loss, supra note 6, at 1219.
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buy the securities which the broker dealer had underwritten or in
which he has a trading position; the persuasion of a customer to sell
good securities in order to buy securities in which the dealer has an
interest; and the difficulty for the unsophisticated customer in dis-
tinguishing between the two functions and their implications.
On the other hand, the report specifies abuses which stem from
sources other than the combination of the functions, such as high
markup, high pressure selling, manipulation, floating inferior securities;
and publication of fictitious quotations. Among the practices which are
incident to brokerage activities are unsuitable recommendations, ex-
cessive trading or "churning," and, in general, the subordination of
the interests of the customer to those of the broker. It. is clear that the
segregation of functions is either meaningless or of very little value if
the dealer, though not allowed to act as a broker, is nonetheless per-
mitted to create a fiduciary relationship between himself and the cus-;
tomer. The' report points to the danger of an underwriter inducing
brokerage customers to 'buy the securities which he has an interest in
selling. But the same danger exists if, instead of brokerage customers,
the dealer has buying customers, who have the same trust in him as
they would have in an agent. It therefore would seem that the segre-
gation of functions is not very effective if the dealer is permitted to
deal directly with the public. Yet, in the 'United States the system of
a dealer selling to customers directly, rather than through a broker, is
well entrenched. Talk of segregation, therefore, is completely unrealistic.
The industry has persistently opposed segregation. In 1941 it
requested that the SEC's power in the matter of segregation of func-
tions be abolished.47 The main argument was the loss of profit which
would result in higher cost to the customer.'" Mr. Wallace H. Fulton,
in his address on the twentieth anniversary of the NASD, considered
the successful combatting of the segregation proposals as one of the
chief achievements of the NASD. This is the NASD's position today.
Yet this is not the end of the story. The evil created by the
absence of the complete segregation of the dealer from the public con-
tinues to exist and had to be remedied. We often see that as a result
of an obstruction the same goal is achieved through other means. The
attempts to segregate the broker and dealer functions have failed. An
alternative method of protecting the customer was to impose upon the
dealer the duties of a fiduciary, making the distinction -between broker
and dealer merely of academic interest. This trend is justified by the
facts. In his capacity as a dealer, the broker dealer usually acts as an
advisor to the customer. A relationship of trust and confidence is estab-
47 Loss, supra note 6, at 1217.
48
 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra
note 10, at 828.
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lished between them. The difficulty is that the duties which stem from
a fiduciary relationship do not always coincide with the interest of the
dealer. Duties thus imposed are difficult to enforce if the broker dealer
is allowed to continue his conflicting activities. The imposition of
fiduciaty duties on the dealer is based on the theory that when the
dealer hangs out his shingle he represents that he shall deal fairly with
his custoiner: 4° this is known as the "shingle theory." The duty is
based, not upon the presence of agency but upon his professional
status as a broker dealer." This theory applies to excessive markup,
failure to deliVer stock, unauthorized transactions, pledging securities
without authority, accepting funds from customers when insolvent, and
high pressure selling, i.e., "boiler rooms."
The weakness of the shingle theory is that it is effective only in
the most flagrant cases. It has no preventive power; it does not compel
disclosure. It applies only after the customer has already lost his
money. Its contribution is that it recognizes the possibility of the
dealer's status as a fiduciary.
The diftinction between dealer and broker still seems to exist in
the price area. The problem of price disclosure is an old one, and the
story of the price quotations is that of the limitations of the Maloney
Act experiment. In 1943 the SEC proposed a rule requiring full dis-
closure of the profit by the dealer to the customer. The industry reacted.
most sharply.
The Commission was informed that if this . . . rule was
adopted it would eliminate the need for that part of the work
of the Association which represented the greatest service to
the industry and the investing public . . [T]he industry
should not have been expected to support an Association
whose remaining field of service would be so limited."
The meaning is clear; , if this, rule were passed, the members would
not stand behind the Association. Thus, in effect, at the time of its
suggestion, the rule when presented represented a threat to the exist-
ence of the NASD. The proposal was abandoned by the SEC in 1947.
Since 1943, the NASD has attempted to provide sUbStitutes for full
disclosure in its markup policy, its 5% policy, and its unified nation-
wide quotation system.
The markup policy is stated by the NASD rules as follows:"
In the over the counter transactions . . . if a member buys for
49 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
90 Knauss, supra note 43, at 638.
51 NASD Publication by Mr. Wallace H. Fulton on the 20th Anniversary of the
NASD, 1939.
92 R.F.P. Art. III § 4. On the history of themarkup policy see H.R. Doc. No. 95,
supra note 3, pt. 2, at 645-52; for criticism of the policy, id. pt. 2, at 651: -
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his own account from his customer, he shall buy or sell at a
price which is fair, taking into account all relevant cir-
cumstances, including market conditions with respect to such
security at the time of the transaction, the expense involved,
and the fact that he is entitled to a profit.
The 5% policy was an articulation of the markup policy. A survey
has shown that most dealers do not exceed the 5% markup. The
policy really amounted to an enactment of a custom, and a clarifi-
cation of what was a "fair price!'" Disclosure is not a defense against
charges under the 5% policy; it is a defense against charges under the
markup policy."
As for disclosure to the public, the NASD has developed over the
years a better and more unified system of quotations. Yet it does
not represent the actual trading price of a security. It is the result
of adjustments by various methods.'s 5 The industry's vigorous posi-
tion against the public disclosure of the wholesale price is based
on many arguments. The small firms even reject quotations on a
national basis, maintaining that the latter do not take into account
their higher costs. Arguments against disclosure, whether to the
customer or to the public, are as follows: only a small percentage of
the industry engages in malpractice; the proposed rules will be dif-
ficult to enforce and can be easily evaded; those outside the jurisdic-
tion of the NASD are too few to warrant rulemaking by the SEC;
expenses of the over-the-counter market are much higher than those
of the Exchanges—both for communications and for research; dis-
closure would affect the liquidity of the market; the customer is free
to shop for the best bargain—just as in any market, the problem
should be solved not by a rule of the SEC but by cooperation within
the industry."
There were many answers and counter-suggestions. It is admitted
that no one can predict the results of disclosure, but it is pointed out
that in some cases there is a successful over-the-counter market in
securities, even though the wholesale price is disclosed and the spread
53 In order to overcome the anti-trust problem, it was held that the policy is a
guide, not a rule. It was also held that expenses added to the price should not be
excessive; that contemporary cost of a security might be relevant; that disclosure to
the customer was not per se a justification of excessive markup; that the pattern of the
member's markup in various transactions and the nature of the member's business were
relevant factors. The policy is applicable, to selling and buying from the customer as
well as to riskless transactions. Naturally, sales accompanied by a prospectus and public
offerings where the price is disclosed are exempted from the operation of the rule.
54 Westwood & Howard, supra note 7, at 540.
55 For a description of the development of the quotation problem, see Securities
and Exchange Comm'n, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 630-43 (1963). .
56 Id. pt. 2, at 646.
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is greater than on the Exchanges." It is further argued that the public
can be educated to pay more for over-the-counter securities, that the
existing system encourages aggressive selling to an undesirable degree,
and that it results in boiler rooms which sell bad rather than good
securities because they can buy bad securities at a low price and mark
them up excessively.
The attempts to solve the problem of price by means other than
disclosure have not been successful. The end of the story is the recom-
mendations of the Special Study of the SEC which are similar to the
SEC proposal in 1943, viz., disclosure and quotations representing
actual market price without adjustments.'
There is yet another aspect to the price of a security, and the
dealer plays yet another role with regard to it. Securities have been
described as "intricate merchandise," but they differ from merchandise
in the usual sense. "Merchandise" denotes something that is bought
and sold but which is destined ultimately for consumption. Many
of the general antitrust laws pertaining to competition and other activi-
ties affecting prices are designed for this kind of consumer merchandise.
Competition is welcome, and price fixing is prohibited because such
practices tend to prevent price reduction. Lower prices are the main
goal of a state which seeks to raise the standard of living of its citizens.
Securities, not being consumer goods, should not necessarily be gov-
erned by the same rules. Lower securities prices might not always be in
the public interest. The price of a security should be determined by
supply and demand of the market operating under normal conditions.
That is why stabilization is allowed, even when it results in higher
prices; that is why manipulation is forbidden, even when it results
in lower prices.
On the Exchanges, manipulation takes a different form than on
the over-the-counter markets, mainly because the first is a concen-
trated, auction market and the latter a dispersed, negotiation market.
Regulations forbidding manipulations are contained in the Exchange
Act of 1934 and the rules enacted thereunder. The NASD rules cover
the same area." Policing such manipulation of the Exchanges was
left to the Exchanges themselves. Policing the over-the-counter mar-
kets was left to the SEC. Since the over the counter market is a
negotiation market, manipulation is tied up with fraud, i.e., the relation
57 Loomis & Rotberg, Over-the-counter Market Quotations, 62 Mich. L. Rev.
589 (1964).
58 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 2, at 674-78, especially recommendations
3, 5, and 7. For full disclosure in riskless transactions, see recommendations 8, 9, 11,
and 13.
59 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958); 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1958); 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1958). R.F.P. §§ 5, 6, 11, 17, and 18.
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between the broker dealer and his customer, while on the Exchange,
it relates to the broker dealer vis-a-vis the anonymous public.
We see that with regard to manipulation the Exchanges and the
NASD have made a wholehearted attempt at regulation. And even
though the attempt may not have been a complete success, there is a
consensus that such practices should be eliminated. They hurt every
person in the industry, except the manipulator. He profits not only
at the expense of the public, but also at the expense of his colleagues.
These practices are considered fraudulent and dishonest, and their
policing is compatible with the trade's interests. They seem to be
best regulated by the industry itself, i.e., by the members in their daily
contact with each other.
The main difficulty seems to be that in his relation to the customer
the dealer has the advantage of information which the customer, even
if he exercises skill and diligence, cannot obtain. He also occupies a
position of trust vis-a-vis the customer which the usual dealer in mer-
chandise does not. This combination breeds the germ of temptation.
D. The Advisor
As do the dealer and the money lender, the broker advises. The
broker dealer advises the public at large, the owner of a discretionary
account, the customer of long standing, the new customer, and the
reluctant customer. He also adyertises, thereby giving advice in his
capacity as dealer.
If he is engaged only in advising the public qua advisor, his
activities are subject to the provisions of the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940." It was recently held that an investment advisor who buys
securities immediately prior to recommending them and sells soon
afterwards is under a duty to disclose to the public the fact of his
dealings in these securities." The advisor was held to be a fiduciary.
Disclosure serves here as a preventive measure in case of impropriety,
and puts the public in a better position to judge the information and
advice rendered.
If the broker dealer advises the customer—even though he is act-
ing as a dealer—he becomes a fiduciary. A dealer who is also in the
business of an investment advisor is held to a higher fiduciary standard
than a dealer who counsels his customers merely as an incident of his
business as a dealer. The dealer investment advisor, although avowedly
acting as a principal, has placed himself in a position of trust and
confidence in relation to his customer, and is therefore subject to an
60 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. lig 80a-1-80a-52 (1958).
61
 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Note that if
the investment advisor is not engaged in selling securities, he is not under any self-regula-
tory body. 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1392-1417 (2d ed. 1961). H.R. Doc. No. 95,
supra note 55, pt. 1, at 381.
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obligation which is stricter than the mere avoidance of taking a price
that is not , unreasonably related .to the market price. He must make
full and complete disclosure of every item in the transaction that is
relevant to the fact that his interest is adverse to that of his customer.°'
A broker, 'as - we have seen, is a fiduciary of his customer and is
under an obligation to disclose to and to act in the best interests of his
customer. If he represents that he is an expert, he should be one.
The cardinal NASD rule of behavior pertaining to advice is as
follows: 63
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or ex-
change of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable
for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, dis-
closed by such customer as to his other security holdings and
as to his financial situation and needs.
This duty imposes an obligation to obtain the information, even though
the customer did not volunteer it. The rule also applies to excessive
trading or "churning." The NSYE has the same rule labeled: "Know
thy customer." It is interpreted as imposing a duty to "use due diligence
in learning the essential facts relative to every customer.""
If a member is entrusted with money which he may invest ac-
cording to his own discretion, he is prohibited from effecting trans-
actions which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial
resources and character of such an account."
The SEC rule was not limited to discretionary accounts and ap-
plied whenever the customer was in the habit of following the dealer's
suggestions and whenever the dealer induced his customer to engage
in excessive trading."
Before the dealer may offer a loan to the customer he must, under
the SEC rule, deliver a statement to the customer setting forth the
customer's obligations and risks under such a loan and all the com-
missions and payments which the customer undertakes to pay. After
obtaining information from the customer, the dealer must determine
that the entire transaction is suitable to the customer, and must give
him a written statement setting forth the basis of such determination.
There are no NASD rules applying specifically to the content of
selling literature, viz., the advice of the dealer qua dealer, except one
62 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra
note 55, pt. 5, at 56-60 on research and investment advice.
03 R.F.P., Art. III § 2,
64 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 239.
615 Id. pt. 1, at 238-39.
66 Frey, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 39-40 (1957).
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broad general rule—NASD Manual G-19. The NASD enforces the
SEC's rules governing selling literature of investment company stock.
The NYSE, however, requires truthfulness and good taste, emphasizing
that rules can never replace good business judgment."
Finally, the dealer who also advises the issuer is faced with con-
flicting duties in his dual capacity. 68 The NASD has not dealt with this
problem at all, and only recently has the NYSE begun to consider it.
Parallelling the dealer's selling and buying activities are his
changing relations with the customers. These range from the relation-
ship of trust in discretionary accounts" and public advising" to the
fiduciary relationship with those customers to whom he gives invest-
ment advice, and with whom he establishes confidential relationships."
He is also a fiduciary to those customers who relied upon him spe-
cially;" but his obligation to those strangers to whom he merely sup-
plies literature or with whom he engages in institutional selling is less
strict." The requirements and duties imposed upon the broker dealer
in this spectrum of relations, trust, fiduciary, semi-fiduciary and ad-
vantageous selling position, are not well defined; neither are the rela-
tions of the parties clearly delineated. The suitability rule seems to
apply to any advice given to. any customer, but perhaps would not
apply to selling literature. There are two problems with the current
rule. First, the rule imposes the same requirements on very different
situations. It presupposes a fiduciary relationship between the broker
dealer and the customer. One immediately questions the necessity of
following this rule if the fiduciary relationship is absent. Second, the
rule implies that the broker dealer has his stock or has available vari-
ous kinds of securities; that he is capable of judging in an unbiased
fashion which security is more suitable for his customer; and that,
as far as the dealer is concerned, one security sold will be as good as
another. It is apparent that all these suppositions are unrealistic.
Interwoven in the special rules pertaining to the industry are the
general laws regarding fraud, misrepresentation, trustees, and fidu-
ciaries.
When must a broker dealer advise a customer to sell? Suppose he
knows or should have known of the impending bankruptcy of a com-
pany whose shares he had recommended to the public. Should he stop
87
 NASD Manual J-51; SEAR No. 6846, Mac Robbins & Co. (1962) ; H.R. Doc.
No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 376.
08 H.R. Doc. No, 95, supra note 55, pt. 5, at 63-66.
89
 In the Matter of R. H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955).
70
 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra note 61.
71 In the Matter of Hamill & Co., 28 S.E.C. 634 (1948).
72 In the Matter of Ethel, Johnson & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947).
73
 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 5, at 49.
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selling to the public? Or 'should he recommend sale to the public?"
Should not advice incidental to selling activities entail duties imposed
upon the advisor qua advisor? Would it not be more realistic and just
to inquire into the selling literature itself? And if it contains advice,
to impose upon the sender of the literature the same requirements
imposed upon the advisor? These questions have one easily discern-
able common denominator: they are not matters of degree but of
principle. They reflect the different attitudes toward the function
and place of the dealer in the regulatory system of the securities busi-
ness. Is he selling a commodity or is he giving advice? It has been
said that he is selling "intricate merchandise." That description has
resulted in complex and conflicting standards of behavior. In view of
the above questions, the suitability rule therefore raises doubts as
to its own suitability.'"
Before enacting the Securities Act of 1933, Congress was faced
with the choice between two conflicting philosophies: disclosure or
regulation." The advocates of the disclosure theory prevailed. In-
vestors were to be given all the facts and nothing but the facts, and
then, so help them God, they were to form their own judgment as to
the worth of the security and the soundness of the business.
The disclosure theory assumes that a public which is given the
relevant facts can form its own judgment. This is not always ac-
curate. Just as access to books of law does not enable the public to
form an opinion of the legal implications of certain factual situations,
so does access to information not assure intelligent comprehension of
a prospectus or a financial statement. The achievement of such under-
standing might require a team of professional men: the lawyer pointing
out the legal implications of the structure of the company, the ac-
countant assessing its financial position, the economist evaluating its
financing, and the technical expert judging the feasibility of its opera-
tions. How many people, except for the institutional investor, do in
fact rely upon their own judgment in making an investment decision?
The inescapable conclusion is that the broker dealer by his very func-
tion and position, whether he wishes to or not, serves as the nation's
investment advisor.77 Evaluating a security is difficult, even after
appropriate inquiries. When Congress decided upon the disclosure
philosophy it had allotted the broker dealer a place in the regulatory
74 Knauss, supra note 43, at 640. It seems that a broker dealer is under an obliga-
tion to inform the client that a security is unsuitable, to furnish financial statements to
customers for any security that he recommended, and to reveal the basis for his opinion
about a security. H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note.55, pt. 1, at 344.
7 5
 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 344.
70 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 21 (2d ed. 1961). See H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note
55, pt. 5, at 59 for recommendations as to more disclosure regarding advice.
77 Loss, supra note 76, at 124.
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scheme of the securities business. He is not only under a duty to
refrain from abuses, but is also invested with the function of advising
the public. The government was to refrain from judging a security as a
business proposition. This task thus fell to the securities industry.
E. The Market Maker
"Each market maker . . . in a sense, functions as a miniature ex-
change providing a situs for the collection of buy and sell orders.""
There are, of course, significant differences between the market maker
and the Exchange. The market maker determines the selling price of
the security and all orders funnel through him; orders do not meet
directly as they do on the Exchange. The market maker exercises a
greater power and possesses a greater hold over the market which he
has created, especially if his is the only market for the particular
security.
The market maker aspect of the broker dealer's acitivity is not
only his selling and buying, but also his choice of security in which
to make a market. Except for a few securities which are sold directly
by the issuer to the public, the above statement applies to all securities,
including those which are extremely speculative. The judgment of
the security in which he will trade is, in a way, the decision the
market maker makes for the investing public." In 1933, Congress
placed the responsibility for the distribution of 25 billion worthless
securities at the broker dealer's door." There are people in the industry
who deny that responsibility. They say that a high percentage of
worthless securities is inevitable, and that the broker dealer cannot
and should not control this phenomenon. Today, the argument runs,
we are familiar only with Ford, General Motors, and other existing
automobile manufacturers. But who remembers the public's money
which was lost in the hundreds of automobile manufacturing companies
which flourished at the beginning of the century but dissolved soon
after their incorporation. Who remembers the public investment in
canals? And what about today's uranium and electronics? The suc-
cesses of today are built on the failures of yesterday. A few companies
make good while the rest melt away with the public's money. This is
the way it has been and this is the way it shall be, for in a capitalistic
society the public is the financier of industry's experiments and in-
novations.
There are, also, allegations that the public's greed is to blame
78
 Loomis & Rotberg, supra note 57, at 590.
79
 See H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 2, at 675 for a recommendation of a
system of official identification of the primary market makers in each security.
SO House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, Federal Supervision of
Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933).
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for its loss. Yet the public's appetite is whetted by the broker dealer's
advertising of quick riches. How far should the public be protected
against its own folly? What is the duty of the broker dealer with
regard to the choice of securities in which he creates a market? Should
the NASD promote higher standards of ethics guiding the market
maker in the choice?
III. THE SCHEME OF THE MALONEY ACT
When the Maloney Act was passed little was known about the
over-the-counter markets. Thus, while the Act had an underlying
philosophy and a model according to which the over-the-counter broker
dealers were to organize and function, the SEC was entrusted with the
power to work out the details. The philosophy was self—as opposed to
governmental—regulation; the model was the Exchanges.'
A. Organization: The Self-Regulation Theory
The two sides of the coin of self regulation are the relations within
the organization—between the members and the organization and be-
tween the members themselves—on one hand, and the relations be-
tween the organization and its members vis-a-vis the public on the
other. These two aspects both influence and interact upon each other.
When the Maloney Act was passed, the memory of the NIRA fiasco
was still fresh in the mind of the country. This memory no doubt
contributed to the attitude of the legislators with regard to member-
ship in self-governing bodies and qualifications for entering the trade.
It also influenced their decision to minimize government regulation.'
The Maloney Act legislators envisaged the following: the creation
of a few organizations, democratic in character, in which membership
would be voluntary; the provision of incentives for organizing and
remaining organized; the regulation of relations between the members
and with the public; the promotion of ethical standards; the education
of the members; the reduction of governmental expenses; and the
guardianship by the government against tyranny of the organization
towards its members and against laxity of standards in the public in-
terest. All this was intended to be modelled on the Exchanges, which
were considered very much like over the counter markets.
Let us examine this plan in view of twenty-five years of experi-
81
	 Mr. Justice William O. Douglas said in 1 Conference News, Investment
Banking Conference, Inc. No. 11 A: "The pattern is simply that provided by Congress
for the Exchange."
82 A further factor, of which everyone was aware at the time, was that the NYSE
was low in the public esteem, for the Whitney scandal had shaken the public's confidence
in the NYSE. The over-the-counter market's new organizations were free of any such
stigma, and could thus start with a dean slate.
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ence. Comparison of the NASD performance will be made with that
of the NYSE, and questions arising out of this comparison will be
posed.
B. Number of Organizations
One of the unexpected results of the Maloney Act was the
emergence of only one organization of broker dealers instead of many.
Although this development is welcome because of the ease of coordina-
tion, it has great disadvantages. Standards and activities of members
are highly diverse. The result is a compromise with regard to prin-
ciples; and, as we shall see, the deterioration of the organization's con-
trol over its members, generalization of the rules without the possibility
of articulation, and lack of member enthusiasm when the organization
does not serve their vital interests.
C. Voluntary Organization
The assumption that an industry will always choose to regulate
itself instead of being regulated by the government has not always
been substantiated by later experience. Yet, broadly speaking, it is
reasonable to accept the proposition that the securities industry in
general and the NASD in particular preferred self to governmental
regulation.
The Maloney Act did not make membership in the future organi-
zations of the broker dealers compulsory. It merely made membership
attractive; profit and prestige were the positive incentives to become
and stay a member.' The Act granted the organization partial exemp-
tion from the anti-trust laws by allowing a provision that only members
may be granted discounts and price concessions by other members."
As previously noted, the inception of the NASD was surrounded
by greater public support and prestige than the NYSE then had.
Twenty-five years later the picture is completely different. There is
no doubt that the NYSE is the leader of the industry. Every member
of the NYSE advertises the fact that he is a member. Yet the NASD
rules limit advertisement of membership in it." Two reasons were
given for this limitation. First, as long as many members are not up
to the minimum standard—because .there are no requirethents as to
minimum capital, knowledge and experience—such advertising would
operate as a fraud on the public. It might create the impression that
there is a special guaranteed standard attached to membership. Second,
as "Businessmen do not strive for profit alone; . . . security, power and prestige
play an important role, in conjunction with, or even in opposition to, the profit motive."
Katona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behaviour 194 (1963).
84 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. $ 78o (1958).
85 NASD By-Laws, Art. VIII $ 2; NASD Manual H-10.
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the larger members are not at all eager to advertise their membership
in the NASD.
The main reason for the NASD not maintaining a high degree of
prestige seems to be the quality of its members and the diversity of
their activities—from the giant Merrill Lynch to the one-man office.
The Exchange, on the other hand, is more homogeneous. Until re-
cently, the principle of unqualified entry into the trade prevailed.
This resulted in loss of prestige for the organization. One insolvent
member or one boiler room can spoil the reputation of hundreds of
firms if the public attributes its failings to the entire organization.
The profit incentive for joining the NASD has its limits. It is of
little value to a member who does not take part in underwriting which
may be policed with regard to concessions while other transactions
may not. And, in fact, there is little difference here between a
member and a non-member if the first does not participate in under-
writing. Further, one may sell securities without being a member
of the NASD. As a result, the profit incentive is effective only to
the extent that it pays to be a member. If the rules of the NASD cut
too deeply into profit, the incentive is gone. The different position of
the Exchange may be noted. Loss of membership there means loss of
the right to trade on the Exchange. The control of the NASD upon
its members is, therefore, less than that of the Exchange and the
incentive to join and remain in it is weaker.
D. Furthering of Common and Public Interests
People unite in order to further their common interests. Workers
join trade unions; businessmen join chambers of commerce. Quite
naturally, the NASD's choice of a solution to any problem is influenced
by self-interest. It is in the interest of over-the-counter markets that
companies shall not be registered on the Exchanges, that the profit
of the broker dealer shall not be disclosed to the customer—although
both may also be in the public interest. It is also in the interest of
the over-the-counter markets that variable annuities be considered
securities—which happens to coincide with the view of. the SEC that
this is also in the public interest. There is nothing disreputable in this
attitude. On the coutrary, it welds the members together and gives the
association its raison d'etre. But it must be accepted as a limitation of
self-regulation in the public interest.
The SEC criticized the NYSE for advertising in order to
stimulate business for the Exchange." "In its role as self-regu-
lator the Exchange stands in the shoes of the government itself,
and must have the appropriate degree of aloofness." 87 Self-govern-
88 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55; pt. 5, at 182.
87 Ibid.
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ment can be viewed not only as power bestowed on the individual,
but also as conduct consistent with the public interest which does
not require governmental intervention. A father who disciplines his
son exercises governmental powers, usually with discretion and
freedom from intervention. Yet when he oversteps the boundaries of
what is considered the public interest, e.g., causing the child physical
harm, government will step in, impose restrictions, and sanction them
by penalties. The father performs his governmental duties without
aloofness; he gratifies his own desires and interests. Too great a degree
of aloofness is, however, incompatible with human nature, especially
when the activities dealt with are not professional. Why is the absence
of aloofness injurious to self-government? Is being an outsider the
only way to govern? Could not self-government be carried out even
more effectively when motivated by self-interest? Mr. Justice Douglas
recognized this element: "[R]estrictions must be consistent with
profit motive, which in the final analysis is and must remain the driv-
ing force in our economy."' It would seem better to realize the limi-
tations of self-government, and utilize it to the extent that it is com-
patible with self-interest, rather than trying to shape it against the
nature of things, thereby rendering it impotent.
Lastly, the involuntary aspect of the voluntary organization must
not be overlooked. The securities industry was not given a choice be-
tween self-government or no government. It was given a choice between
self-government or Governmental government. The industry chose the
former.8° Its philosophy of self-regulation is based on the theory that
if the industry does not do it, the government will; therefore, the
industry had better do it. The necessity of taking the public in-
terest into account comes in through the back door. It is the means of
keeping the government out rather than the realization that serving the
public is one of the goals of the industry.
The attitude towards public interest is one of the important ele-
ments for consideration in evaluating the limitations and advantages
of self-regulation. We may conclude that the NASD and the Ex-
changes, do not, as do the professions,°° consider the public interest
88
 Douglas, Democracy and Finance 645 (Allen ed. 1940).
88
 Commencement Announcement Exercises, Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.,
June 10, 1962. See Commencement Address by Mr. Keith Funston, Chairman, NYSE.
90
 Let us consider the attitude of the professions toward the public interest. The
goal of public service is embedded in the definition of a profession. Pound, The Lawyer
from Antiquity to Modern Times 5 (1953). A profession performs a unique service;
it requires a long period of academic training. Service to the community rather than
economic gain is the dominant motive. We may measure the broker dealer's activities
against these criteria. He does perform a unique and essential service to the public but
he has no academic training. He has been granted, like a profession, a large measure of
self-government and autonomy; he is also subject to a code of ethical conduct. Although
at least part of his trade is to give service, profit is his goal. The public interest is stated
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as one of their goals; rather, the NASD and the Exchanges consider
it as-
 a means to an end.
E. Democratic, Open Organization
The principle established by the Maloney Act was that any honest
man may be a broker dealer. A converse development has taken place
in some professions and vocations, that of achieving a high standard
of performance by voluntary action.
In 1942, the NASD proposed to set a minimum capital require-
ment for membership, which was rejected by the Commission. 91 The
membership qualifications required by the states and the SEC do not
include a period of preparation or special knowledge for broker dealers
in general or for underwriters, market makers, and investment advisors.
Since 1956, the NASD has provided for an examination program, but
with only limited success. 92
It is difficult to predict the result of imposing high standard ex-
aminations. It would seem that the greater the degree of specialization
the higher the standards will become. This in turn might lead to pro-
fessionalization of some of the functions of the broker dealer, i.e., in
his capacity as an advisor. It might lead to the division of the NASD
into groups representing the more specific interests of the different
functions. This may well be only a theoretical possibility, but it cer-
tainly would be beneficial both to the broker dealers and to the public.
F. Ethics
One of the purposes of the Maloney Act was to create an orga-
nization of broker dealers which would promulgate and enforce rules
for higher standards of conduct than those of the government. The
industry has asserted that it imposes rules of ethical conduct on its
members, and the SEC expects this of the industry."
Both the industry and the Commission distinguish between a legal
and an ethical requirement, the first to be enacted by the government
and the second by the self-governing bodies. Is there in fact a differ-
ence between ethical and legal rules in the securities industry? It may
in negative terms: he should refrain from wrongdoing because it does not pay.
This attitude is the crux of the matter, the heart of the difference between a profession
and the broker dealer's activity. Loomis & Rotberg, supra note 57, at 497.
51
 A group organizes voluntarily and distinguishes itself by acquiring a higher
standard of knowledge and skill. Then the higher standard receives state recognition and
protection. Finally, the law imposes the requirements which were initiated by the
private group on any person who wishes to practice the profession. See Freund, Legisla-
tive Regulation passim (1932).
92 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 73.
93
 "If the latter are to fulfill the role for which they are thought to be uniquely
suited, they must also, of course, exert leadership in defining and elevating ethical
standards for their members, above and beyond the legal requirements." H.R. Doc. No.
95, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 161.
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lie in the sanctions behind them. Ethical rules may be those enforced
by social, rather than by legal means. This, however, is not the case.
Both the SEC and NASD rules are laws in the sense that they are
backed by almost identical sanctions and both derive their power
from the legal scheme of the securities statutes.
Another distinction may be in the kind of rule. Laws tend to be
prohibitive rather than requiring affirmative actions because "pro-
hibitions are more easily enforceable than requirements, and the viola-
tion of a prohibition . . . is less easily excused than the violation of a
requirement." 94
 Rules of ethics tend to be of the requiring type by
setting a manner of conduct. But, again, this is not the case. Most
of the NASD rules correspond to the rules of the SEC. With few
exceptions, most of them are prohibitive in nature."
There are also cases where the ethical standard prescribed by a
group is higher than the legal standard set by the legislature because
it represents not the course of conduct of the majority, but that of a
minority." The argument that the rules of the NASD are "above and
beyond the call of duty" of the industry to the public, is untenable.
Most of the rules are an incorporation of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities statutes and the rules enacted thereunder. Furthermore,
it seems that if the self-regulatory body had not enacted the rules,
the SEC would have done so. Yet, in its role of self-regulator of the
interrelationships of its members, the NASD has promoted ethical
standards of conduct. As a result, the securities business carries out
its contractual obligations much more promptly than required by law
and performs contracts even in cases where the law does not impose
an obligation to perform.
G. Enforcement
A group which participates in the promulgation of a rule appli-
cable to it will obey that rule better than if it did not share in its
enactment. It has also been shown that the more active the members
of the group are in the enactment of the rule, the more effective is
its enforcement."
94 Freund, supra note 91, at 87.
95
 Unfortunately, these rules are couched in vague language and have been applied
in varying situations; thus a clear principle has not been enunciated.
96 "[Ijn the regulation of professions, higher standards are possible under a system
of optional than under a system of compulsory certification." Freund, supra note 91, at
105.
97
 Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct to the Mandatory Process, 38 Ind. L. Rev.
377, 386-87, 398 (1962). This is an account of the results achieved by the FTC through
conferences with representatives of business, consumers, and public services. The guides
and rules are promulgated by the FTC alone. Intensive and informal compliance follows
the conferences. The conference method seems to provide the consumer and the business.
man with the rallying point essential to extensive efforts in self regulation. See Jaffe,
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The promulgation of the NASD rules does not follow this pattern.
The NASD does not initiate its rule making; it is prodded into legis-
lation by the SEC. The staff of the SEC meets with the staff of the
NASD and they negotiate the demands which the former puts before
the latter. Upon agreement a proposal is separately laid before the
SEC and the Board of Governors of the NASD. If all agree—
well and good. If not, remarks and objections are passed to the
staffs which negotiate again, until all finally agree. This has been the
pattern of action during the last twenty-five years. Thus, one of the
great advantages of self-regulation, viz., the participation of every
member or most members in the rule-making which results in effective
adherence to the rules, has been lost to the NASD." The NASD had
the tools and the power to use them, yet failed to do so. The reasons
for this failure would seem to be the diversity of membership and the
conflicts of interest—both of the members and of their individual
functions—so as to make a unanimous or majority decision difficult,
if not impossible.
The tendency of the NASD and the NYSE has been to base
the adjudications on violations of the Net Capital Rule rather than
on unethical conduct, such as improper selling practices or vio-
lation of the suitability rule. Both the Exchange and the NASD are
reluctant to proceed against members on improper selling practices.
Violation of the Net Capital Rule is easier to prove. Proceedings
on improper selling practices involve persons outside the trade and
hurt the reputation of the industry because they imply moral turpitude.
Bankruptcy of a member hurts the interests of the industry more than
improper selling; and, finally, there seems to be no consensus as to
what constitutes proper selling practices. The result is curious. In con-
trast to the Exchange, there is little justification for bestowing upon
the NASD the power to self-regulate the financial responsibility of
its members. There is justification for investing it with power to regu-
late selling practices. Yet the asssociation neglects the policing of
the latter while it attends to violations of the former.
The main tool for policing is the staff. It is the key to control
both by the NASD and the Exchanges. In the securities industry,
policing has greatly improved whenever a staff was given power to
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 212 (1937): "Participation in
management satisfies the craving for self-expression, for power. . . [fit may stimulate
initiative and quicken the sense of responsibility. .. ."
98 Most of the NASD rules, except the original ones, do not take the form of
amendments to the Rules of Fair Practice, but are interpretations and resolutions. The
reason for this form of legislation is the fear of dissent on the part of some of the
members, or, worse still, of the majority. The method of interpretative rules was
challenged and upheld on the theory that these were not rules at all.
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oversee the performance of those regulated.99 The staff is loyal to
the organization and identifies its interests with the organization's
goals. It is permanent, gathers experience, and has practical as well
as technical knowledge of the problems. What has developed in the
NASD is a private police power. There is no doubt that one of the
main reasons for the loose organization of the NASD not falling apart
at the seams is the existence of its staff.
A systematic analysis of the rules governing various abuses in
the securities industry may lead to a classification of rules which lend
themselves to self-regulation and others which do not. Where self-
regulation is effective, the method of adjudication which is less formal
and time-consuming, the business attitude, and all the other advan-
tages of adjudication by members of the trade come into play.
H. Expenses to the Government
One of the reasons for self-regulation is that it is less expensive
to the government. But note that while the policing of national and
state financial institutions is done by the government, the expenses in
most of the cases are borne by the institutions.' 99 It may well prove
cheaper for the industry to be policed by the SEC.
Policing of malpractice which cannot be recorded is invested in
non-governmental bodies not because of expenses but because of
difficulties inherent in policing such activities.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE: GUARDING AGAINST
LAXITY OF STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE ORGA-
NIZATION TOWARD ITS MEMBERS
Until recently, the staffs of the SEC and of the NASD worked more
in an atmosphere of service than in one of surveillance. They nego-
tiated, and they agreed, but no one obeyed. The suggestion that it is
the right and duty of the SEC to supervise the performance of the
Exchange has been sharply criticized by the members of the Exchange,
who prefer the maintenance of the status quo.
The intention of the SEC is to change the existing relations with
the self-governing bodies, to place more emphasis on supervision, to
make frequent visits to the offices of the NASD in the districts, to
99 H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 55, pt. 5, at 190.
100 In 8 states costs are financed by a combination of fees and appropriations ; in
21 states banking departments are financed by legislative appropriations; in 20 states
costs are borne by the banks. All national banks pay for examinations by the Federal
authorities. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation pays the costs of examination of
insured banks who are not members of the Federal Reserve System from its insurance
assessments. Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, Comparative Regulations of Financial Institutions, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
60 (1963).
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supervise complaints, adjudications and recording, and to prompt the
district offices of the NASD into more active self-regulation.
It is doubtful whether indiscriminate prodding by the SEC's staff
will produce the desired results in the long run. Government can effec-
tively curb power. It is less effective in activating power through
reluctant rulers. Incessant prodding need not produce habits when
other forces act against these habits. The experience in the promul-
gation of NASD rules casts doubts on the power of activating tech-
niques. It might have the reverse effect of what is expected, for a
self-governing body gets used to the fact that it need not legislate
until it is required to do so.
Yet, there comes a point at which no change is a stalemate, as
in the case of the quotations problem. Some change must be made.
Some risk must be taken when years of experiments have brought no
satisfactory results.
Proponents of change argue that self-regulation should not be used
as a method to control the securities industry. Self-interest of the
broker dealer is in direct conflict with public interest. It is too great
to be overcome. Prodding is no solution. Self-regulation is just as
expensive as direCt regulation. Policing of financial responsibility
should be borne by the industry. Selling practices and other activities
which are difficult to police by the government are not policed by the
industry either. The problem should be solved by changing the rules.
Black and white rules, containing objective tests, will enable the cus-
tomer, if disclosure is imposed, to police the practices. The advocates
of this position conclude that the best method is direct government
regulation.
The relations between the government and the self-regulating
bodies need not be the same in all areas of the broker dealer's activities.
Different problems require different solutions. The Commission, in
fact, has been more active than it might seem. It has initiated almost
all the new legislation, and has developed a new concept of liability,
the shingle theory. While it formerly left the field of policing to the
NASD, the SEC now intends to enter that area as well."' The NASD
is left with one field of activity: the regulation of the relations between
its members. In this field it has been a success.'
The sanctity of contract has been maintained by the securities
industry at a higher level than is required by law because the industry
could not exist otherwise. Breach of contract is very severely punished.
101 It is interesting to contrast the reaction of the NASD and the NYSE to the
SEC's increased activity. While the NYSE is trying to maintain the status quo, the
NASD seems to accept the recent staff program of visits and inspections.
102 H.R. Doc. 95, supra note 55, pt. 5, at 196.
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In fact, on a few occasions, the SEC has put a check on the zeal of
the NASD in this area. 1"
As a trade association regulating the business practices between
members, the NASD has fulfilled a useful function without which
trade could not be carried on. The SEC has played the conventional
role of judicially reviewing the NASD decisions and providing safe-
guards against possible tyranny of the organization.'"
V. THE EXCHANGE As A MODEL
The model for the Maloney Act experiment was the Exchange.
Barring minor differences it was considered similar to the over-the-
counter markets. The similarity lay in the economic function of the
two bodies, the economic relationship to the nation, and the basic
fiduciary responsibility to the investors. But the Exchanges are dif-
ferent from the over-the-counter markets in many important aspects.
The Exchange is an old institution. Its rules developed with the
needs of the members and were adapted to new circumstances. The rules
were an example of private law-making influenced by the government
because of the importance of its functions to the public. The prime
objective of the Exchange was to regulate the activities of its members.
In 1792, twenty-four brokers had organized in New York in order "to
promote . . . just and equitable principles of trade and business."
This maxim is now considered to express the standard of conduct of
the NYSE toward the public. At the date of incorporation these words
probably established the principle governing the members' behavior
toward each other. Only later did the principle acquire a new and
wider meaning. The same process may be observed in the evolution
of the principle: "Know thy customer." It was first used as a warning
to the members against defaulting customers, and subsequently devel-
oped into a rule imposing a duty upon the members to give the
customers suitable advice.
The public utility aspect of the Exchange was superimposed
onto the traditional organism. The NASD lacked that tradition, for it
was a legislative creation based on the Exchange and influenced by the
NIRA era. Other elements of the Exchange which are absent in the
over-the-counter markets made it difficult for the NASD to develop a
tradition of its own and impossible for it to adopt fully the traditions
of the Exchange.
The Exchange is the market place where all business must be
conducted. As a result, it is valuable to the members and has an im-
portance apart from any member. It is not replaceable and its good-
1°3 See 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1379 (2d ed. 1961). In the Matter of Nat'l
Assin of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945).
104 Loss, supra note 103, at 1374.
214
THE MALONEY ACT EXPERIMENT
will is priceless. The members have a real interest in promoting the
reputation of the Exchange as well as that of the members. Since the
over-the-counter market is widely dispersed, its members do not have
a similar interest in promoting its reputation.
The Exchange is an auction market: the over-the-counter market
is a negotiation market. They deal in different kinds of securities.
The over-the-counter market creates markets for local issues, small
issues which are not distributed widely enough for auction trad-
ing, or blocks of securities too large to be readily digested by the
Exchanges. The quality of the securities traded on the over-the-
counter market tends to involve either the least or the most amount
of risk.'" Most brokers on the Exchange act as brokers; most brokers
on the over-the-counter market act as dealers.'" Thus, it is clear that
the model of the Exchange cannot solve the problems which are peculiar
to the over-the-counter markets such as price disclosure and public
quotations, or adequate and prompt execution of orders, simply be-
cause these problems do not exist on the Exchange.
Apart from the value of the Exchange as a market place, that
the members of the Exchange execute their business in only one
place affects their behavior. It is easier to control. Customs as to
dress, movement on the floor, sign language and the like, add to the
power of the organization over its members. The need for a code of
conduct is much greater on the Exchange than in the over-the-counter
market. The NASD members do not all deal with one another. They
trade in smaller groups. The Exchange needs one code; otherwise
chaos will ensue.
Notwithstanding the Exchange Act of 1934, which was designed
to convert the Exchanges from private clubs to public institutions,
the Exchanges retained a great measure of autonomy. 107
 They impose
membership requirements and codes of behavior among the members,
between the members and outsiders.'" The NASD has remained an
open organization.
These differences may explain why the NASD has less control
over its members and imposes less stringent rules of conduct than the
Exchange. They may explain why the model of the Exchange did not
always help to solve the problems of the over-the-counter markets.
1" Id. at 1277-78, 1283-87.
108
 Holleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and
Trading in Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 86, 91-92 (1959).
107 Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 214, 221-22 (1959).
1" Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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VI. THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES
The various functions of the broker dealer do not conflict per se.
A conflict does exist between the rules of conduct regulating these
functions, or between some of these rules and the self-interest of the
broker dealer, e.g., the dealer-advisor functions. There is no agreement
on the standards governing the broker dealer's activities. There is
no agreement regarding the governing function among his various
activities. The SEC tends to emphasize the advisory function, which
leads to a higher standard for a fiduciary, even when the broker dealer
is simultaneously acting in another capacity. The industry emphasizes
its merchandising aspect, and argues that the broker dealer is subject
to the duties of a merchandiser even when he is also acting in his
advisory capacity. Under these circumstances, general provisions are
of little help. Most of the disagreements about legislation between
the SEC and the industry stem from the differences of opinion as to
the principles underlying the duties of the broker dealer, e.g., the
segregation and the quotation and disclosure problems. Some persisting
difficulties of enforcement also have their roots in this discord, e.g.,
selling practices and the execution of orders.
Although the SEC imposes the standards of a fiduciary on the
broker dealer, it does not apply that standard invariably. Fiduciary
duties are not imposed in all securities transactions, but only in special
circumstances. Neither does the SEC apply all the remedies that
result from a breach of fiduciary duties. Rather, it limits them to
disclosure.
The problems with which the NASD had to deal had plagued the
industry even before the birth of the NASD, e.g., quotations, price
disclosure, manipulation, representation, churning, misuse of cus-
tomers' funds, et cetera. It seems that except for free-riding (which
is similar, but not identical to the old practice of "corners"), none of
the undesirable practices is new. Yet the NASD has not succeeded in
eliminating these practices or even in defining standards of conduct.
Even the customs of the industry lack clear underlying principles.'
The SEC has therefoie taken steps to establish new standards. The
process still continues; the new law is in the making.
VII. CONCLUSION
The demands made upon the NASD seem to be as conflicting as
the functions of the trade itself. It was expected to act as an Exchange,
although it lacks the essential elements of an Exchange. It was re-
quired to perform like a professional organization, although it does
100 Jackson, Stock Broker's Liability under Customs, Usages, and Rules, 12 Clev.
Mar. L. Rev. 111 (1963).
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not have the attributes of a professional organization. It was designed
to be an open association—and yet to maintain a high standard of
performance by its members.
The NASD is essentally a trade organization; and, like every
trade organization, should possess self-regulating powers. It is doubtful
whether at this stage the NASD should be expected to do more than
regulate the relations between its members under the supervision of
the SEC. In a decade, it had proved incapable of establishing accepted
standards of behavior for the activities of the trade. Neither was it
capable of solving problems in a selfless manner. It has acted like a
trade organization and should be recognized as such.
Unlike the Exchange, the NASD has not developed a large mea-
sure of control over its members. It was formed on the model of an
Exchange—which is not wholly appropriate—and remained a loose,
diffuse organization. It seems that before a body can be entrusted with
the duty of imposing rules which might be adverse to its members'
interests, that organization must have the strong backing of its mem-
bers. While the Exchanges do fulfill this requirement, the NASD does
not. As a condition precedent to its being a self-regulating body in the
sense of the Maloney Act, it should be a strong trade organization.
During the years, the roles of the SEC and the NASD have been
reversed. The NASD acted, but its actions were initiated by the SEC.
The NASD showed initiative mainly when regulating the relations
between members. Past experience has proved that it is unrealistic
to expect the NASD to regulate in the public interest; it seems
wasteful for the SEC to regulate through the NASD. The SEC has
initiated most of the legislation and enforcement programs of the
NASD de facto. Why not grant this situation recognition de jure?
In time, the relations between the SEC and the NASD might
be reversed again. The industry could always assume self-regu-
lation by imposing a higher standard of behavior upon itself. The
NASD may split into smaller groups. Members whose main activity
is service (e.g., advising) may professionalize in the sense described
in this paper. 11° Members whose size and function are similar may form
tighter trading units and assume more Exchange features, more unified
standards of conduct, and less conflicting functions (e.g., wholesale
dealers). These groups may recapture their self-regulatory powers
simply by exercising them, thereby rendering government intervention
unnecessary. It may well be that greater awareness of public needs
is better developed through voluntarily organizing than by decree. Such
awareness may be sharpened by the desire to restrict government
activities; it may also be motivated by the goals of higher profits and
110 See supra note 98.
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prestige. Finally, such an awareness of the public needs may be moti-
vated by self-interest, when, as in the case of the NYSE, the trade
realizes its function as a public utility.
If the NASD is treated as a trade organization, if it develops
according to its peculiar needs and functions, if it becomes strong, if
it splits into unified groups, it may then be capable of assuming the
full burdens of self-regulation imposed upon it by the Maloney Act.
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